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INTRODUCTION
On November 17-18, 2005, participants from govern-mental, international, and non-governmental organiza-tions from all over the world convened at American
University, Washington College of Law in Washington, DC, to
discuss the future of emissions trading (“ET”) systems. The
workshop, entitled “Confidence Through Compliance in
Emissions Trading Markets,” was convened by the International
Network for Environmental Compliance & Enforcement
(“INECE”). Trading systems are proving to be a successful
means of reducing greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, but they
only work to the extent there is effective compliance and
enforcement. Participants focused on ways to implement com-
pliance and enforcement strategies into ET systems.
One of the workshop’s main goals was to promote informa-
tion-sharing among participants, with special emphasis on com-
pliance as well as the possibilities for linking trading systems to
control emissions worldwide. Presenters shared ET experiences
from around the world and explored the role that information
technology and private stakeholders might play in ET schemes.
Through the comparison of experiences between the
European Union’s Emissions Trading System (“EU ETS”) and
the United States’ ET systems for SO2 and NOx, the workshop
sought to: (1) establish a set of best practices and appropriate
policy responses to compliance and enforcement challenges; (2)
emphasize the important role that compliance and enforcement
play in both reducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing
stakeholder confidence in the program and market; (3) identify
key elements of an effective trading system; and (4) determine
how best to create a “common currency” to allow for trading
among different international trading systems.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: CONFIDENCE THROUGH
COMPLIANCE
Angelos Pangratis, the Deputy Head of the European
Commission Delegation to the United States, delivered the
keynote address for the opening day of the workshop. He dis-
cussed the EU ETS, the world’s first international, mandatory
emissions trading system, and how its success is instrumental
for future international efforts to achieve the drastic cuts in
GHGs necessary to combat climate change. Because the success
of this system will affect future initiatives, the EU ETS initiative
is too important to fail. For emissions trading systems to meet
their goals effectively and efficiently, though, it is necessary to
have high levels of compliance. Mr. Pangratis concluded his
address with elements for a successful emissions trading system
– public policy initiatives, a credible market system to encour-
age private sector involvement, and the need for developed
countries to lead by example.
OVERVIEW OF WORKSHOP THEMES
CREATION OF VIABLE EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS
Throughout the workshop, a common theme was that vol-
untary market measures alone are not sufficient to drive climate
change policies – public policy that promotes emissions reduc-
tions at both the state and national levels is critical. In order to
achieve large-scale emission reductions on a global level, a
strong regulatory framework that creates a market for carbon
reduction must be created. A viable option is an emissions trad-
ing system that provides economic incentives to reduce emis-
sions. Such a system should then inspire the private sector to
develop new technology and manufacturing processes that lead
to further emission reductions. However, the effectiveness of
such a system relies on the government’s ability to establish an
effective regulatory framework. An effective framework, in
turn, depends on achieving high levels of compliance.
In order for any ET system to work, both the public and pri-
vate sectors must have confidence in the system, which requires
that policies be enforced. Public opinion will play a big role in
building confidence in trading schemes. If an ET system is high-
ly visible in a society, that society might be more willing to par-
ticipate generally in environmental policies, and might place
greater demands on companies. Increased social pressure on the
private sector will also build a greater sense of social and envi-
ronmental responsibility in the public. However, public aware-
ness and responsibility cannot be accomplished through regula-
tion alone. 
ADVANTAGES OF CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEMS
A cap-and-trade system is created when governments
limit emissions in a defined area and then allow trading with-
in that area. The alternative is a command-and-control
approach, in which the government relies solely on penalties
to deter companies from excessive emissions. Workshop pre-
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senters agreed that cap-and-trade systems are more effective
than traditional command-and-control systems for reducing
GHG emissions. With respect to achieving high levels of com-
pliance, a cap-and-trade system offers several advantages.
First, it allows companies to freely choose their own compli-
ance strategies, including how to yield the most economically
efficient and environmentally effective results. Under a com-
mand-and-control system, however, firms are not given an
option of how to reduce their emissions – instead they must
follow set regulatory instructions and may be penalized for
failing to comply. 
Second, a trading approach encourages compliance by
changing the roles of both the regulator and the regulated party
and aligning their interests. Under a command-and-control
approach, both parties might feel as if they are pitted against
each other. Under a trading approach, though, both parties
have a strong interest in maintaining market integrity. For
example, regulated parties do not have an interest in cheating,
because doing so would decrease the tradable value of their
allowances in the system. Thus, when both parties’ interests
are aligned, the prospect of achieving higher levels of compli-
ance is greater.
Finally, a trading approach offers greater transparency
than a command-and-control type regulation, which in turn
encourages public confidence in the system. An emissions
trading system with an effective monitoring, reporting, and
verification program will provide the public with a tangible
means of evaluating the system’s effectiveness. The public
will have greater confidence in the data if the way in which it
is collected is open and allows for obvious accountability.
Additionally, greater transparency allows the public to better
understand the role a trading system plays in emissions reduc-
tion. Under emissions trading systems, some of the cost of pro-
ducing pollution-intensive products is internalized and passed
on to the consumer. As such, transparency in the system can
allow consumers to see the impact of their choices on the envi-
ronment and adjust their purchasing decisions accordingly,
thus increasing levels of compliance.
MONITORING, REPORTING, AND VERIFICATION
The success of an emissions trading system depends on
how well emissions are monitored, reported, and verified, and
these elements in turn are determined by the degree of compli-
ance and enforcement. As such, monitoring, reporting, and ver-
ification (“MRV”) procedures were a key focus of the work-
shop. In particular, workshop participants considered the neces-
sary elements for an effective MRV program, and discussed the
potential for cross-border MRV application.
Lessons Learned for Compliance and Enforcement
The workshop began with a discussion comparing different
methods for compliance and enforcement in emissions trading
systems. Christian Egenhofer, from the Centre for European
Policy Studies, provided an overview of the European Union
emissions trading model. Joe Kruger, from Resources for the
Future at the time of the workshop (now with the National
Commission on Energy Policy), presented the U.S. emissions
trading model. Respondents Leigh Mazany, from Environment
Canada, and Kunihiko Shimada, from the Institute for Global
Environmental Strategies at the time of the workshop (now with
Japan’s Ministry of Environment), provided insight on emerging
trading models in Canada and Japan. 
General lessons and recommendations became evident from
such comparisons. In designing an effective emissions trading
system, methods of achieving compliance and enforcement must
be considered first and foremost. The key regulatory mecha-
nisms for achieving compliance in an ET system are monitoring,
reporting, and verification of emissions. With respect to enforce-
ment policies, a country will also have to determine the kind of
penalties (for example, discretionary or automatic) it wishes to
apply for non-compliance. The presenters noted that compliance
and enforcement policies must be expansive, and have a local,
regional, and national focus. Such policies must also be compre-
hensive in covering both industry and the public. Furthermore,
effective compliance and enforcement programs must ensure
accountability and integrity by thoroughly measuring emissions
and encouraging transparency for the benefit of the public.
Though such a system must inherently be multifaceted, system
designers must ensure that compliance and enforcement pro-
grams are simple to operate and implement. 
Participants also emphasized the importance of information
technology in an emissions trading scheme, particularly with
monitoring. They noted that information technology could pro-
vide greater transparency in data collection and analysis, and
encourage data sharing among program participants. It was also
generally agreed that, when feasible, regulators should take
advantage of technology in order to automate regulation of
emissions. For example, the U.S. model relies heavily on com-
puters and technology in its MRV program. In fact, the U.S. pro-
gram is now generally “paperless,” and much of the trading is
done online. This has greatly contributed to the program’s over-
all efficiency.
Overall, the presenters agreed that a successful MRV pro-
gram would depend on a variety of factors, including: (1) eco-
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nomic incentives for industry involvement; (2) clear roles and
accountabilities for those regulating and enforcing the pro-
gram; (3) transparency and engagement of stakeholders at all
stages of program implementation; and (4) the program’s
cost-effectiveness. 
Factors Affecting MRV in a Future U.S. GHG Trading
Program
Should the United States attempt to limit GHG emissions,
it is likely that they will turn to an emissions trading system. The
United States has already established several successful trading
programs for other emissions, such as SO2 and NOx, which
cause acid rain. Mr. Kruger highlighted certain factors that the
United States should consider when designing this system. 
First, regulators must consider the point, or target, of the
regulation, as this will affect how the system will be designed.
Regulations can be targeted “downstream” at the power sector,
“upstream” at the economy at large, or using a hybrid of both
down- and upstream for greater coverage. 
Second, the United States should consider using continuous
emissions monitors (“CEMs”) to monitor GHG emissions.
CEMs are a more comprehensive method of monitoring emis-
sions, which collect data on each ton of emissions from each
regulated unit. This method is used by the United States to mon-
itor other emissions, but is not mandatory. For an ET system,
reliance on CEMs would depend on the point of regulation and
whether CEMs are already in place. 
Third, the United States will have to determine the impact
of state and regional programs. Several states and regions have
taken initiative in experimenting with cap-and-trade systems.
Building on existing CO2 regulatory programs would make
implementing a large-scale trading system more efficient. 
Finally, the United States should consider experimenting
with voluntary initiatives. Voluntary protocols, however, would
require adaptation for mandatory programs. In particular, this
might create tensions over who bears the burden of the pro-
gram’s costs. Furthermore, the level of reporting required for a
voluntary program would be different than that for a mandatory
program. The regulators would have to consider who would do
the reporting – whether it would be performed internally by the
company or externally by a third party. Experimenting with vol-
untary programs, however, would be useful to inform future
mandatory protocols. 
Linkage Systems
A major focus of the workshop was how different countries’
emissions trading systems could be linked to provide for more
effective and comprehensive emissions control worldwide.
Although linkage will depend on a wide range of factors, work-
shop participants agreed that a truly global ET system would best
function with uniform, or, at least harmonized, MRV require-
ments. A common language and vocabulary would also be neces-
sary to design a comprehensive, multi-national trading scheme.
Linkage would also require strong political will, and would raise
various issues regarding the role of developing countries.
Verification and the Verifiers
Several presentations and working groups focused on the
verification aspects of an emissions trading system. In particular,
who should verify emissions and how should that verification be
performed? In the United States, for example, verification is pri-
marily performed by the government, which relies heavily on
electronic monitoring and occasional site inspections. The EU,
on the other hand, relies on third parties to verify emissions.
However, the EU currently has no uniform standards of verifica-
tion or accreditation for those third party verifiers. As such, one
of the issues addressed at the workshop was whether it would be
possible to develop an EU-wide body that could accredit veri-
fiers, rather than having each Member State oversee its own ver-
ifiers. Such a comprehensive program would result in more uni-
form standards, and thus, more confidence in the results. 
One possibility discussed was hiring professional verifica-
tion and certification firms. Such firms would be competent,
independent, and accredited. An independent firm would pro-
vide consistency in emissions reporting (over time and across
borders), transparency (clear, factual reports that could be repli-
cated), independence (they would be free from bias and conflict
of interest), ethical conduct (with trust, integrity, and confiden-
tiality), fair presentations (which would be truthful and accu-
rate), and due professional care (which would inspire confi-
dence in stakeholders). 
Third party verifiers would provide several benefits, including
avoiding bureaucracy, providing for greater separation of powers,
increasing efficiency, and spreading liability. Furthermore, third
party verifiers could provide a knowledge transfer from the private
sector to the government. Workshop participants also stressed the
importance of accreditation processes for verifiers and penalties –
including criminal sanctions – for dishonest verifiers. The partici-
pants expressed an urgent need for high-quality verifiers in order
to implement its ET system more efficiently. 
WORKING GROUP SESSIONS
Participants divided into small working groups on each day
of the workshop. On the first day, working groups evaluated the
similarities and differences between EU and U.S. MRV models.
On the second day, working groups discussed potential best
practices for international harmonization of trading systems. 
DAY ONE: COMPARISON OF MRV SYSTEMS IN THE EU
AND U.S. MODELS
At the first working group session, participants divided into
four smaller groups that focused on comparing costs between
EU and U.S. emissions trading system approaches, institutional
responsibilities in MRV, the role of information technology in
emissions trading systems, and the role and potential for further
development of third party verification.
Working Group One: Cost Comparison between EU
and U.S. Approaches
This group first identified three major costs for implementing
emissions trading systems. First, the group acknowledged the cost
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of establishing the emissions trading scheme, which typically
falls on the country’s government. Second, there will be specific
process-oriented costs for monitoring, reporting, and verification.
Finally, there will be auxiliary costs. The group questioned
whether such costs would be financially beneficial (as a boost to
alternative industries and technological innovations) or detrimen-
tal to companies (by increasing pressure for reporting at the cost
of confidentiality). The group also commented that these costs
might affect small and large businesses differently. 
Next, the group examined the costs that would fall on the
government. The group observed that the government’s fiscal
reality would have a significant impact on the financial structure
of the trading system. As one participant noted, not all govern-
ments can afford to hire new staff to travel around the country
and conduct verifications. 
The group concluded its session with recommendations for
further analysis of EU and U.S. trading systems to identify
where the costs are and who is currently bearing them. The
group noted that because the EU and U.S. trading systems are so
distinct from one another, a comparison between the two sys-
tems might reveal more efficient cost-sharing strategies.
Overall, the group suggested that countries developing emis-
sions trading schemes must focus on efficiently dividing costs
between the public and private sectors. 
Working Group Two: Institutional Responsibilities in
MRV
This group examined what kinds of rules should govern the
MRV program for an emissions trading system. The group first
noted that strict, formulaic guidelines did not work, and that for
the U.S. system, more prescriptive guidelines were needed. The
group found that there is a great need for flexibility in such
MRV operations, and that in particular, industry desired a
greater degree of certainty. 
The group then proposed a third party verification system,
and compared current programs in the United States and the EU.
The group found that initially, third party verification sounds
very appealing. Third party verification would provide a means
to avoid burdensome bureaucracy, increase the separation of
powers and responsibilities of those involved in the trading sys-
tem, and facilitate appeal procedures. Overall, the group thought
that a third party verification system has potential to dramati-
cally improve a trading system’s efficiency. 
Furthermore, the group found that a third party verification
program could be quite advantageous to a large trading system,
such as the EU, which encompasses 25 different jurisdictions.
Third parties would help a large system develop a uniform tem-
plate for MRV that would provide consistency among the dif-
ferent jurisdictions.
The group also highlighted other advantages of third party
verification. Third party verification would spread liability, for
instance, and allow for an efficient transfer of knowledge and
capacity from the private sector to the government. 
The group warned, however, that more research into defin-
ing the appropriate level of assurance of verification would be
needed to ensure that third party verifiers have universal quali-
fications, and to ensure that conflicts of interest do not arise
between third party verifiers and their clients.
Working Group Three: The Role and Potential of
Information Technology to Automate MRV
The United States has had great success in using informa-
tion technology (“IT”) to monitor, report, and verify emissions.
This group examined whether the EU might also benefit from
shifting to a more automated MRV program. Reliance on IT can
be beneficial to an emissions trading system because it can
reduce costs, improve consistency and efficiency, and contribute
to building greater confidence in compliance.
The group first discussed the role IT plays in the U.S. MRV
program. The U.S. system has been evolving dramatically over
the last decade, including significant improvements in the use of
electronic auditing and quality assurance and quality control
(“QA/QC”) testing requirements. The United States has tried
using automated verification checks with some success.
However, such a system is limited in its application to certain
emission sources, such as those produced by cement plants or
using mixed fuels. 
The IT system in the EU, on the other hand, is in its initial
growth stage. The group noted, however, that there is a signifi-
cant push towards automating the monitoring, reporting, and
verification of emissions data. Currently, there seems to be a
window of opportunity to create a uniform system of MRV
using IT in the EU, but – the group warned – it must be done
before ad-hoc systems develop, which become difficult to
change. The group highlighted the fact that, even with automat-
ed and standardized systems, the opportunity for data exchange
is critical. Otherwise, a significant data entry burden might be
created.
Overall, the group found that the most important element of
an effective IT system is transparency. In the United States,
emissions data is publicly available. In the EU, however, emis-
sions data is treated very differently – it is made confidential for
25 years or more. Transparency is important because it builds
confidence among both market stakeholders and the public. 
The group concluded with recommendations that interested
parties should look for opportunities to share more ideas on cre-
ating an effective IT system. In particular, the group suggested
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that a standard form for submissions be created, although it noted
that this might be difficult to do given varying interpretations of
certain directives. The group also highlighted the need for edu-
cation – of both public and private stakeholders – on the benefits
of an emissions trading system. Furthermore, a push for the cre-
ation of electronic mandatory reporting would force a new way
of looking at the system. This might push all parties to become
involved in creating a more effective system, rather than simply
implementing electronic capabilities within the old system.
The group also noted that because many issues in the EU
are generally left to the Member States to resolve, it might be
beneficial to create a reference MRV model that all the Member
States could refer to when developing their own systems.
Despite the potential lack of political support for such a system,
the group strongly suggested that an MRV system should be
developed that would be “ready to roll out” once the political
will to implement such a system is present. This has been done
in the United States – a reporting and verification system is in
place in the event that political support is granted. The United
States could cooperate with the EU to design a similar system.
Finally, the group emphasized the need for another INECE
workshop in the second half of 2006 on the role of IT in MRV
systems. The workshop would need to focus on addressing the
many issues involved with implementing IT systems – in par-
ticular, how to improve ease of use of such a system, and how
to promote consistency among different systems. The group
suggested designing a hypothetical plant and performing simu-
lations of how U.S. and EU systems would operate at this plant.
Overall, the group found that IT, as a standardized system, could
build confidence, increase compliance, and promote greater cost
effectiveness in an emissions trading system.
Working Group Four: The Role of Third Party
Verification
This group examined the role of third party verification,
and focused on exchanging lessons learned by the UK and
United States. The United States relies heavily on the govern-
ment to verify emissions levels, whereas the UK relies primari-
ly on third party verifiers. The group found that the main differ-
ence between the U.S. and EU verification system was account-
ability – while the United States primarily holds only the source
liable, the UK may hold both the source and verifier liable for
incorrect emissions data collection. In the United States, most
industries report emissions data themselves. Therefore, some-
one in each particular company is responsible for reviewing and
approving emissions data. If the data proves incorrect, that par-
ticular person may be prosecuted. In the UK, in contrast, a third
party company reviews and approves emissions levels. That
third party verifier then signs a statement approving the emis-
sions levels and gives that statement to the environmental
enforcement department. If those calculations are wrong, the
third party verifier may be held liable in addition to the compa-
ny producing the emissions. There is a little tension in the UK
system, though, because typically the operator of the plant pays
the verifier for his or her services. Even though verifiers in the
UK need to meet certain independence requirements, there is
still a suggestive link between the company and verifier,
because of who pays the verifiers’ costs. 
The working group emphasized the importance of compe-
tency requirements in order to have an effective international
verification system, and examined the U.S. and UK accredita-
tion systems for guidance. The UK accreditation process
requires that a verifier show independence from the company he
or she will be verifying. Additionally, the verifier must be com-
petent to collect data, and objective in assessing results. Because
UK industries must pay for verification, accreditation ratings
allow industries to choose the most cost-effective verifier for
their company. Even though this might reduce the financial bur-
den on the government, it has the potential to create a trade-off
between price and quality. 
This group also looked at whether the United States was
considering third party verification, and whether it would be
feasible without a huge shift in philosophy. U.S. government
representatives in the group responded that the United States
was unlikely to shift towards a third party verification approach;
rather there has been an apparent shift in environmental man-
agement to self-auditing processes. One question with which the
United States has recently struggled is whether leniency would
be granted if a company performed a self-audit and identified a
problem. To some degree, the U.S. system fosters third party
verification, but it is not entirely independent. Many industries
will bring in third party companies to help with the monitoring
and reporting, but since these companies work at the request of
the industry, their independence may be diminished. 
The group concluded with some factors to be considered
for establishing an inter-jurisdictional verification program for
the EU. In particular, the group highlighted the need for lan-
guage requirements (verification forms and guidelines should be
in a single universal language, but auditors need to retain the
ability to interpret regulations and documents in local lan-
guages), universal competency requirements, and incorporation
of varying accreditation approaches.
DAY TWO: BEST PRACTICES FOR CROSS-BORDER
HARMONIZATION
At the second working group session, workshop partici-
pants divided into two smaller groups to discuss the role that
Who should verify
emissions and how should
that verification be
performed?
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INECE could play in assisting the development and linkage of
inter-jurisdictional MRV schemes, and how cooperation
between industry and government could help achieve greater
compliance in emissions trading.
Working Group 1: MRV Linkage Issues
This working group focused on the international climate
change enforcement community’s immediate, intermediate, and
long-term needs to facilitate MRV linkage issues. In particular,
the group found that INECE could provide considerable assis-
tance by providing a knowledge base for design, monitoring,
and enforcement strategies, a compilation of “lessons learned”
case studies, and guidance on accreditation and training of emis-
sions verifiers.
The group first focused on the immediate needs of the EU. At
the time of the workshop, there were fewer than one hundred
working days until the first year of the EU’s monitoring system
was completed, and some two hundred days until the verification
of emission reports was to be completed. As such, the group found
that there was an immediate need for IT assistance – particularly
with single-window interfaces, and generally with strategies for
using IT in emissions trading regimes. The group suggested the
need to bring EU regulators in touch with regulators from other
countries that have had some success with these IT models, such
as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).
An overall lack of human resources was another immediate
need highlighted by the group. The lack of trained certifiers posed
significant problems in the short-term, especially for smaller mar-
kets like Australia. The few qualified professionals are primarily
located in countries with larger markets. As a result, the best
experts and technical consultants are often too busy to take on
new clients. One group member pointed out, for example, that the
same consultant worked for both the Canadian government and
the EPA. One solution to this human resource problem might be
a centralized list of qualified technical consultants.
The group next shifted its focus to intermediate needs, and
found a great need for an international information knowledge
base. The group noted that countries are currently in various
stages of implementing emissions trading systems. However,
the group pointed out that often these countries’ long-term goals
are the same, so there is great potential for knowledge sharing. 
The group identified a need to promote best practices for
the design of emissions trading systems. One participant noted
that because emissions are an artificial commodity, their trade
does not happen in a naturally occurring market, and as such,
their market must be specially designed. Australia, for example,
has created a special task force to investigate the feasibility of
creating a conventional cap-and-trade approach. Designers have
discovered that there currently exists no comprehensive
resource that details a decision tree that regulators could use to
help establish such a market. 
There is a need to bring together case studies, best practices,
resources, evaluations, and handbooks. Such resources are or
will be available, but are not located in any centralized location.
For example, the EPA produced a “Tools of the Trade” manual
based on their system. Furthermore, the EU will begin evaluation
of their system early this year, and conclusions and “lessons
learned” analyses might be available as early as summer 2006.
The group also suggested canonizing the fundamental ele-
ments of a carbon-trading regime. Two systems might employ
different monitoring techniques but with the same objective of
having accurate and timely information about emissions levels.
Often systems that look quite different from a technical point of
view are fundamentally quite similar. Reducing various systems
to their fundamental elements might assist in the evaluation of
regional systems. 
The group also found that an important intermediate need is
training. However, there is a lack of adequate training resources.
The group noted that while we might still be several years away
from the first university degree in Emissions Regulation, demand
for qualifiers would remain high, especially in the smaller mar-
kets. The group suggested that INECE could collaborate with
private industry, particularly insurance companies, to develop
accreditation standards for emissions verifiers. The group pro-
posed that eventually such discussions would move from accred-
itation standards to training. As a result, universities could devel-
op curricula to train verifiers and relieve the human resource
shortage. The group also noted that training would be funda-
mental to developing a common parlance in the industry.
In terms of long-term needs, the group found that all imme-
diate and intermediate efforts would ultimately promote more
efficient systems further down the line by promoting common
international parlance for emissions regulation. Common objec-
tives will come from common parlance.
Working Group 2: Potential for Industry and
Government Cooperation
This group discussed what obstacles and opportunities were
available for government and industry to cooperate with each
other in order to achieve more effective compliance in emis-








needed for harmonization of industry and government coopera-
tion. To achieve trust, the group suggested that both sectors
needed to increase integrity and confidence in the program
itself. This could be done by making information available to
the public and developing a system that would effectively
resolve disputes concerning confidentiality. The group noted
that because of the tension between transparency and confiden-
tiality, shaping public perceptions must incorporate strong rule-
making procedures that will allow for regular support and eval-
uation as well as strategic planning and changes. 
The group concluded with a finding that a multidisciplinary
approach was necessary, but that government and industry need-
ed to share common values to encourage emissions trading, and
full cooperation from stakeholders would be critical to the sys-
tem’s success. The group found that industry’s reluctance to
accept trading systems could be alleviated by providing greater
certainty and flexibility (for example, by having coherent, but
flexible, government policy) and by promoting effective com-
munication. Group participants agreed that emissions trading
systems could be encouraged through political interest and pres-
sure, presentation of successful examples, education of small
and medium-sized firms, and assistance in technology and infra-
structure to new EU member states.
CONCLUSION
The workshop concluded with a discussion of what “next
steps” should be taken. Many participants proposed further
areas of needed research regarding emissions trading systems.
Such research suggestions included: (1) examining the role of
the private sector and environmental regulations; (2) analyzing
how to best bring verification, environmental management sys-
tems, information technology, and industry together; and (3)
determining a common currency – comparing technologies on a
technical level and comparing different regulatory cultures. 
Workshop participants unanimously decided that future
meetings were necessary, and that definite timeframes, dead-
lines, and goals should be determined to facilitate effective and
efficient progress in the field of emissions trading.
Power point presentations from the workshop are available on
the INECE website at http://www.inece.org/emissions. 
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